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Introduction
On March 18, 2003, the United States launched a military attack
against Iraq, which resulted in the overthrow of the ruling Baathist party
and the ouster of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. In a letter dated March
20, 2003, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations
informed the President of the Security Council that U.S. led coalition
forces had commenced military operations in Iraq. The letter provided
that military intervention was "necessary in view of Iraq's continued mate-
rial breaches of its disarmament obligations under relevant Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1441." The letter stated "the operations are substantial and
will secure compliance with those obligations... [Tihe actions being taken
are authorized under existing [Security Council] resolutions, including its
resolutions 678 and 687."
1 The Author would like to note that this article is written in his personal capacity
and does not reflect the views of the Jordanian Government.
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The legal basis offered by the United States was that Security Council
Resolution 687 imposed a series of obligations on Iraq, including extensive
disarmament obligations, which were conditions of the ceasefire the reso-
lution established. A material breach of these obligations by Iraq would
eliminate the basis for the ceasefire and revive the authority to use force
under Resolution 678. According to the United States, because Iraq was in
material breach of its disarmament obligations, which the Security Council
affirmed in Resolution 1441, and because Iraq refused to comply when
given a final warning to do so (thus committing a further material breach),
military action could be justified as an "appropriate response." The letter
also asserted the United States' right to self-defense as another basis for the
military attack against Iraq.
The United States based its legal argument for the invasion of Iraq on
two grounds: (1) the enforcement of relevant Security Council resolutions
and (2) self-defense against the threat posed by Iraq. On the political level,
the U.S. administration made clear months prior to the war that the U.S.
policy regarding Iraq involved changing Saddam Hussein's regime and dis-
arming Iraq. In order to avoid accusations that U.S. military action in Iraq
violated international law, including the principle of non-interference in
the domestic affairs of other states provided for in the United Nations
Charter, the U.S. administration argued that military action was necessary
to disarm Iraq and to eliminate the threat Iraq posed to international peace
and security.
The U.S. military ousted the ruling Baathist regime nearly three weeks
after military operations commenced. The U.S. led coalition subsequently
established effective control of the territory of Iraq, thus assuming the
rights and obligations of the occupying power under the relevant rules of
international law. Despite their rapid victory in Iraq, the United States and
the United Kingdom, the two main contributors to the coalition, faced
many obstacles to transforming their military success into a political vic-
tory. Several issues determined the nature and extent of political success
achieved from the military invasion of Iraq.
The first issue was that the use of force against Iraq was highly contro-
versial both on the political and legal levels. This was reflected by the
strong objections raised by key U.S. allies and major global powers, includ-
ing France, Russia, China and Germany, who were members of the Secur-
ity Council at the time military operations began. Prior to the war, those
countries, and most members of the Council, expressed views that immi-
nent use of force against Iraq was unjustified or that the Security Council
did not authorize the use of imminent force. Public debates of the Council
indicated significant opposition to the military attack by members of the
United Nations. Few supported the United States and United Kingdom's
position that relevant Security Council resolutions authorized the use of
force.
The second issue that emerged was the question of the status of the
Coalition in Iraq: whether it is a legal occupying power or a belligerent one.
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Answering this question determines the scope and nature of rights and
obligations of the Coalition vis-A-vis Iraq.
A third issue that the United States had to cope with was the United
Nations imposed sanction on the Iraqi regime. The financial and eco-
nomic prohibitions imposed on Iraq under Security Council Resolution
661 and subsequent relevant resolutions would have substantially impeded
the United States' future plan for the reconstruction and economic rehabili-
tation of Iraq. Most significantly, the limitations imposed on the Iraqi oil
industry and oil export would deprive the country of its major source of
income, which would be necessary for rebuilding Iraq on all levels. Related
to this issue was the oil-for-food program established under Security Coun-
cil Resolution 986, which allows for a United Nations controlled and
administered system for the export of limited amounts of oil to finance the
purchase by Iraq of humanitarian and essential civilian goods. The system
employed a United Nations held escrow account in order to guarantee that
the former Iraqi government would not be able to acquire cash revenues,
thus limiting its capabilities on all levels. The oil-for-food program, follow-
ing the change of regime in Iraq, would have been a major obstacle to the
Coalition's efforts to reconstruct Iraq using the country's financial
resources.
The issue of lifting of sanctions was legally related to the "disarma-
ment of Iraq." Security Council Resolutions 687, 1284 and 1441 imposed
a set of conditions (and a road map) for the suspension and the eventual
lifting of the economic and financial sanctions on Iraq. The resolutions
required Iraq to undergo a stringent inspection, verification and monitor-
ing regime, conducted by the United Nation Monitoring Verification and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) before sanctions would be lifted by the Security Council.
The sanctions on Iraq were designed to guarantee that even if international
inspectors verified that Iraq had disarmed, the ultimate decision of lifting
sanctions remained with the Security Council, whose permanent members
have veto power. Accordingly, to be able to allow Iraq to trade freely,
acquire foreign aid and receive foreign direct investment, a complicated and
time-consuming set of disarmament steps have to be undertaken. Despite
political assertions to the contrary, the disarmament obligations of Iraq are
the duty of the State and do not expire by virtue of the ouster of Saddam
Hussein's regime.
The role of the United Nations in Iraq is a highly relevant factor. The
organization's relationship with the U.S. administration became tense dur-
ing the months and weeks preceding the military invasion of Iraq. Two
main elements led to such tension: (1) the situation in the Security Coun-
cil, including the negotiations pertaining to Security Council Resolution
1441 and the blocking of a United States/United Kingdom sponsored draft
resolution that was intended to secure an "explicit or implicit" authoriza-
tion for the use of force and (2) the briefings and reports made by the chief
international inspectors, Mr. Hans Blix of UNMOVIC and Dr. Mohammad
EL. Baradei of the IAEA, to the Security Council prior to the launching of
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military operations. The U.S. administration considered these briefings
and reports unsatisfactory because Mr. Blix and Dr. El-Baradei made only
technical pronouncements in relation to the inspections in Iraq and never
declared Iraq to be in "further material breach." The United States viewed
this position as the main political and legal obstacle to convincing the
Security Council to authorize the use of force. Following the military vic-
tory in Iraq, the Bush Administration was determined to preserve the lead-
ing and central role in Iraq to the Coalition, thus limiting any role the
United Nations would be able to play. The U.S. aim was to assert the Coali-
tion's authority over Iraq and make the necessary decisions in relation to
Iraq's political and economic future without interference.
In addition to the above mentioned issues, the United States would
have only be able to justify military action in Iraq if a new Council resolu-
tion was adopted authorizing the Coalition to exercise authority in Iraq. A
mandate from the Council was especially crucial given that the use of force
and the resulting occupation were legally questionable. Without such a
mandate, any Coalition action in Iraq or on behalf of Iraq would face major
legal, political and impediments. On May 22, 2003, following weeks of
closed door debates in the Security Council, Resolution 1483 was adopted,
with fourteen votes in favor and no abstentions or votes against (Syria,
which did not participate in the voting session, later that day sent a letter
to the President of the Council informing him that it endorsed the Resolu-
tion). Three issues are key to understanding the goals the United States
sought to achieve through diplomacy: (1) the legality of the use of force in
Iraq, (2) the status of occupation and (3) the effects of Resolution 1483.
I. The Legality of the Use of Force
As previously noted, the United States contended that the military
operations against Iraq was legally justified on two grounds: (1) the
enforcement of relevant Security Council resolutions concerning the dis-
armament of Iraq, in order to restore international peace and security, and
(2) United States' right to self-defense against the threat posed by Iraq.
A. Rejecting the U.S. Argument that Security Council Resolutions
Authorized Military Action in Iraq
The United States argued that Resolution 678 authorizes the use of
force against Iraq by United Nations Member States, and that due to Iraq's
continual material breaches of its disarmament obligations, the ceasefire
established under resolution 687 terminated. Thus, the termination of the
ceasefire revived the original authority to use force. There are several weak-
nesses to this contention that undermine the U.S. legal position. First, Par-
agraph 2 of Resolution 678 "authorizes Member States co-operating with
the Government of Kuwait unless Iraq or on before 15 January 1991 fully
implements the [previous] resolutions, to use all necessary means to
uphold and implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolu-
tions and to restore international peace and security in the area." Accord-
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ingly, the authorization to use force had two conditions: (1) Iraq did not
implement the relevant Security Council resolutions adopted prior to Reso-
lution 678 dated 22 November 1990 and (2) the use of force was to uphold
and implement resolution 660 and relevant subsequent resolutions.
The Security Council does not grant authority to use force to enforce
Council resolutions subsequent to 678 and the use of force is conditioned
on Iraq's non-implementation of prior resolutions. As the language of Para-
graph 2 and the traveaux preparatoire of Resolution 678 indicate, the
authorization was intended to allow the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty
and the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from it. In addition, Iraq's disarmament
obligations exist in Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991 and relevant subse-
quent resolutions. There is nothing in Resolution 678 that indicates the
authorization to use force would extend to future obligations imposed on
Iraq, namely the disarmament obligations.
Secondly, under Section (I) of Resolution 687, the Security Council
declared that "upon official notification by Iraq to the United Nations Sec-
retary General and to the Security Council of its acceptance of the provi-
sion of resolution 687, a formal ceasefire is effective between Iraq and
Kuwait and the Member States cooperating with Kuwait in accordance with
resolution 678." The Council also decided to "remain seized of the matter
and to take further steps as may be required [to implement Resolution 687]
and to secure peace and security in the area."
Subsequently, the government of Iraq sent a letter in which it accepted
the obligation under Resolution 687. From the language of Section (I), the
Council makes clear that the Security Council established the ceasefire
between Iraq and the Allied forces. The Council, which authorized the use
of force according to its powers and functions under Article 42 of the
United Nations' Charter, was the only entity to suspend such authoriza-
tion. It did so by establishing the ceasefire. In order to revoke the ceasefire
and reestablish any prior authorization, the Security Council would have
to make a decision to this effect. The Council affirmed this conclusion
when it decided to remain in charge on the matter and to take any further
steps necessary to implement Resolution 687. The Council specified that
only the Security Council could authorize any further action in the future,
including the use of force against Iraq.
The Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002,
following months of intense negotiation. The first draft of the Resolution
submitted by the United States contained an explicit authorization to Mem-
ber States of the United Nations to use all necessary means to enforce the
disarmament obligations of Iraq, as contained in the draft resolution and
previous Security Council resolutions. However, the explicit language was
dropped at a latter stage due to the objection of several Council members,
including China, France, Germany, Mexico, Russia and Syria. Those mem-
bers refused to include a language in the resolution to authorize the use of
force in case of future Iraqi non-compliance. They insisted on a two-step
approach whereby the Council would have to meet again to determine
what measures to take if Iraq failed to fulfil its obligations.
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Intense negotiations, accompanied by a highly charged political
atmosphere, led to the adoption of complex and ambiguous Resolution
1441. In that resolution the Council decided that Iraq remained in mate-
rial breach of its disarmament obligation under relevant Council resolu-
tions and gave Iraq a "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament
obligations." The material breach language was a compromise. The Coun-
cil recognized that Iraq continued to "materially" breach its disarmament
obligations, but would not authorize, under the resolution, the use of force
for the existing material breaches or future ones. Resolution 1441 also
established an enhanced inspection regime that UNMOVIC and the IAEA
would supervise. Paragraph 2 of the Resolution states that the aim of
establishing this new regime is to bring to "full and verified completion the
disarmament process established by [relevant] resolutions of the Council."
This language is key in determining whether the U.S. position in February
2003 and March 2003 was consistent with Resolution 1441. During that
period, the United States attempted to block efforts in the Council to
develop the program for the verifiable disarmament of Iraq provided for
under Security Council's Resolution 1284. The program, which was to be
prepared by UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors for approval by the Council,
would have decided the key remaining disarmament tasks, to be performed
by Iraq and proposed a long term verification system of Iraq's potential
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) related sites.
Resolution 1441 also provided that Iraq would be committing a fur-
ther material breach if (1) it did not provide UNMOVIC, IAEA and the
Security Council, within 30 days from the date of adoption of Resolution
1441 with a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects
of its programs to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons
including any holding and precise locations of such weapons and (2) Iraq
did not comply and fully cooperate in the implementation of Resolution
1441, including Iraq's immediate unconditional and active cooperation
with UNMOVIC and IAEA. Finally, Resolution 1441 stated that any fur-
ther material breach by Iraq would be reported to the Council, which
would then have to consider the situation.
Despite the general perception that the Council had determined at the
time of the adoption of Resolution 1441 that Iraq possessed weapons of
mass destruction, both the traveaux preparatoire and the language of the
Resolution only suggest that at the time Iraq possessed or formerly pos-
sessed, WMD programs. Secretary Powell, on several occasions before and
after the adoption of the Resolution, stated that Iraq had to declare the
whereabouts of the weapons of mass destruction unaccounted for or pro-
vide proof that it had previously destroyed them.
Iraq submitted its declaration concerning its weapons of mass destruc-
tion programs before the deadline. However, UNMOVIC and IAEA decided
that the declaration was not as complete and accurate as required by Reso-
lution 1441. The international inspectors returned to Iraq and were per-
mitted full and unimpeded access as required by Resolution 1441. Iraq's
cooperation developed as time passed. However, up to the time the war
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started, the chief international inspectors, Mr. Blix and Dr. El-Baradei,
never declared Iraq to be in full active cooperation, despite recognizing that
Iraq was becoming progressively more cooperative with the inspectors.
Mr. Blix and Dr. El- Baradei did not at any stage prior to the war report
that Iraq was in further material breach. This led to tension between the
Bush administration and chief international inspectors, especially Mr. Blix.
The United States adopted an extreme interpretation of the relevant
paragraphs of Resolution 1441 and declared that any State can report a
further material breach by Iraq to the Council. This interpretation was not
supported by the traveaux preparatoire or the plain meaning of the relevant
paragraphs of Resolution 1441. However, the United States declared on
several occasions that Iraq had committed further material breach(es).
Mr. Blix and Dr. El-Baradei confined their reports to factual and tech-
nical information on the fulfillment of their mandates in accordance with
the Council's resolutions and sought to avoid making legal conclusions on
Iraq's compliance. The reports did contain information on Iraqi "failures"
to comply in full. Although the Council held several meetings subsequent
to the adoption of Resolution 1441 to discuss the reports of the interna-
tional inspectors and the Iraqi situation, the Council never determined that
Iraq was in further material breach nor did it decide further measures to
secure Iraq's compliance (as required in Resolution 687).
Under Paragraph 13 of Resolution 1441, the Council recalled that it
has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face "serious consequences" if Iraq
continued to violate its obligations. This paragraph does not amount to an
authorization to use force. However, the United States insisted on includ-
ing the "serious consequences" language to strengthen its argument that it
is an "implicit" authorization for the use of force, that is, that serious con-
sequence would result from material breaches of obligations (the propor-
tionality principle). The shortcoming of this argument is inherent because
it applies (or adapts) the law of treaties and the international law principles
related to State responsibility to Security Council resolutions. The basis
for the United States' argument to use force in the context of Iraq's material
breaches was the application of the principles of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion in the Law of Treaties. Article 60 of the Convention allows parties to a
treaty to terminate it or suspend its operation, in whole or in part, in rela-
tion to a party that committed a natural breach of that treaty. The United
States argued that because Iraq materially breached the ceasefire sanc-
tioned by the Security Council under Resolution 687, the ceasefire termi-
nated and the authorization to use force under Resolution 687 was revived.
The maintenance and restoration of international peace and security
is an independent collective security regime executed by the Security
Council. The decisions by the Council in the exercise of its authority
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter are not treaties. Rather,
they are executive decisions binding on all States. Only the Council deter-
mines the scope and manner of their implementation and the conse-
quences of their breaches. Accordingly, it is not up to a member state to
make decisions related to the United Nations system of collective security
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that the Security Council does not specifically sanction. In the case of the
ceasefire, the Security Council, who decided to implement the ceasefire, is
also the entity that must decide to terminate it. Terminating it, after all,
means to take measures to restore international peace and security against
a threat posed to it. The Security Council did not resort to Article 39 of the
Charter to determine that Iraq's disarmament failures constituted a threat
to international peace and security. Such a determination is a prerequisite
to authorize measures (including the use of force) to restore international
peace and security or to terminate the ceasefire between Iraq and the States
that cooperated with the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. This assumes that
the termination of the ceasefire by the Council revived the authorization to
use force under Resolution 678, which it did not, for the reasons explained
above.
Paragraphs 12 and 13 of Resolution 1441 must be read together. As
such, the steps that the Security Council would take to authorize measures
against Iraq to secure its compliance are as follows: (1) a finding by
UNOMVIC Executive Chairman and/or the IAEA Director-General that
Iraq was interfering with the inspection activities or failing to comply with
its disarmament obligations; (2) the Council is then to meet to consider the
situation and whether Iraq's actions reach the level of threats to interna-
tional peace and security and (3) if the Council so decides, then it must
determine how to implement its repeated warnings to Iraq of serious con-
sequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations. Para-
graph 13 only recalls that it has repeatedly warned Iraq. It does not decide
that such violations will give rise to serious consequences. The paragraph
merely connects the "serious consequences" language to the issue of con-
vening the Council to consider how to secure international peace and
security. This can only mean that the Council is the entity to determine
the serious consequences, that is, the measures to restore international
peace and security.
The United States, United Kingdom, and Spain submitted a Draft Res-
olution to the Security Council on February 24, 2003 that would not have
explicitly authorize the use of force against Iraq, but would implicitly do so
by endorsing the United States and United Kingdom's legal position on the
use of force against Iraq. According that draft, the Council would decide
whether: (1) Iraq committed a further material breach of its obligations
under the relevant Council's resolutions; (2) Iraq's non-compliance with
the Council resolution and proliferation of weapons of mass destructions
constituted a threat to international peace and security; (3) the Council is
determined to restore international peace and security; and (4) Iraq has
failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it by resolution 1441.
The political situation at the time the draft resolution was submitted
made the goal of the draft clear: a tacit acquiescence by the Council to the
potential military action by the Coalition led forces against Iraq. This led
many Council members to oppose the draft. Among them were China,
France and Russia, which officially declared that they would veto the draft.
As a result, the cosponsors submitted an amended draft that contained an
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ultimatum for Iraq to comply by March 17, 2003. According to the
amended draft, Iraq would not only be required to unconditionally, fully
and actively cooperate with regard to its obligations under Resolution
1441, but it would have to yield its possession of weapons of mass destruc-
tions. The amended draft merely escalated the contentious situation in the
Council.
On March 17, 2003, it became clear that the draft resolution would
only obtain four supporting votes, so the co-sponsors issued a statement
declaring that they would not pursue a vote on their draft. This "non-
action" by the Council on the draft resolution is not without legal merit. It
reflects the will of the body entrusted with taking enforcement measures to
restore international peace and security in case of a threat or breach to it.
This supports the conclusion that the Council did not approve at that time
of the use of force by certain member states to enforce Security Council's
resolutions. The contention that such members were acting on behalf of
the United Nations and the Security Council is rebuffed by the non-
approval of the draft resolution, which was interpreted, politically and
legally, to be a tacit acquiescence to the forthcoming military operation.
B. Rejecting the U.S. Argument of Self-Defense
Without going into extensive details, one can conclude that the self-
defense justification for the war on Iraq stands on weak legal grounds.
First, Iraq did not declare war on the United States, or other members of
the Coalition prior to the military invasion by those States. It did not
launch a military attack on any of those States or on other States which are
allied to them under collective self-defensive pacts. Second, there is no evi-
dence that Iraq aided or sponsored hostile acts amounting to acts of war
against the States that attacked Iraq. No links were established between
Iraq and terrorist organizations targeting such States. Further, no claim
was made that Iraq was involved directly or indirectly in the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Third, Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter reserves the right of States to defend themselves individually or
collectively, in case of an armed attack directed against them. The right to
self-defense is suspended once the Security Council becomes seized on the
matter and takes the necessary measures to protect the attacked State and
end the belligerency against it. The right to self-defense only resumes if the
Council fails to take such measures at the appropriate time. The war
against Iraq clearly did not fit the framework of Article 51. Iraq did not
launch military attack against another state and the Council was never
consulted regarding a potential military attack by Iraq or asked to take
measures to prevent such an attack.
The anticipatory self-defense doctrine is, at best, controversial under
international law. It became a weak argument after the creation of the col-
lective security system of the United Nations. Most international jurists
agree that anticipatory self-defense is only legal if the potential military
attack against a state was so imminent that it had no time to consult with
the Security Council, or if the Council was approached but was not able to
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take the necessary measures at the right time to prevent the attack. In
addition, the so-called preemptive strike must adhere to the conditions of
the "Webster Formulation," which is the core international law on the
issue. According to Webster's, self-defense must be confined to cases in
which "the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, leaving
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." The force applied
must be reasonable and non-excessive.
It was never demonstrated that the threat posed by Iraq against the
members of the Coalition was instant or overwhelming. Since the adoption
of Resolution 1441, the international inspectors have not discovered any
proscribed material that poses a threat to the security and sovereignty of
the Coalition members. The reports of UNMOVIC and the IAEA demon-
strated continuous progress in terms of Iraqi active cooperation and full
cooperation in terms of access to the inspected sites. Accordingly, the mili-
tary operation was not necessary and other choices of action existed,
including the continuation of the inspection process. Further, the Coali-
tion's military operations did not satisfy the proportionality requirement
of self-defense. The operation was intended, and resulted, in the overthrow
of a governing regime of a sovereign nation and the occupation of its terri-
tory for an indefinite period of time.
II. The Occupation of Iraq
On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared the end of "major" military
operations in Iraq. At that point, it was obvious that Saddam Hussein's
regime was no longer governing Iraq. Thus, why didn't the United States
declare the end of "war" in Iraq since it established "effective control" over
its territory?
There are several political and legal reasons that might have induced
the U.S. administration not to officially declare the end of the war. One
reason is that the Coalition would have had to release the Iraqi prisoners of
war and cease pursuit of members of the former political leadership in Iraq
(unless they committed serious violations of international humanitarian
law during the war). When the United States released a list of names of
fifty-five senior members of the Baath party and former political and mili-
tary leaders of Iraq for detention purposes, it did not suggest that all of
those pursued were involved in war crimes. Ending the war officially,
would have undermined the legal grounds for pursuing all of the individu-
als on that list.
Another important reason for not official ending the war as that was
the ongoing negotiations at the Security Council regarding a U.S. spon-
sored draft resolution on Iraq. The main U.S. objective during such negoti-
ations was to earn the Council's recognition of the United States as the
governing authority over Iraq for an indefinite period of time. Declaring
the end of the war during that period would have weakened the U.S. argu-
ment against several members of the Council. Those members could have
requested an end to occupation as soon as possible, the transfer of author-
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ity, in the interim, to the United Nations and the eventual creation of an
Iraqi government to assume the sovereign authorities in Iraq. Those were
not the immediate goals for the U.S. government.
However, another obstacle remained for the United States. The legal-
ity of the Coalition's occupation of Iraq was, at best, questionable. As
explained earlier, the use of force that led to the occupation of Iraq stood
on weak legal ground. As a result, the occupation of Iraq was an illegal act
that should not be recognized by the international community.
Under modern international law, occupation can be legal in two situa-
tions. Under a self-defense justification, a State (or States) may legally
occupy the territory of another, or part of it, in the exercise of self-defense
against the military threat of that State, and to the extent necessary to end
such a threat. If and when such threat ends, the occupying State(s) can no
longer exercise control over the territory of the other State and has to with-
draw its troops. Had the U.S. declared the end of war on May 1, 2003, it
would have been compelled to withdraw its troops from Iraq because the
threat posed by Iraq would have no longer existed.
Occupation is also legal if there is a mandate by the Security Council
authorizing such occupation. It is clear that when the military operation
against Iraq commenced, the Security Council had not authorized the Coa-
lition to occupy the Iraqi territory. Accordingly, there was no Council
mandate to this effect.
Based on the above, prior to the adoption of Resolution 1483, the U.S
occupation of Iraq that followed the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein
regime was illegal. This creates at least three legal consequences. First, the
Coalition should have withdrawn immediately from Iraq. State responsi-
bility for the illegal occupation results if there was no immediate with-
drawal. Second, until such withdrawal takes place, the Coalition could not
act in Iraq outside the limits of The Hague Regulations of 1907 and the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. The rules of those Regulations and Conven-
tions apply to the occupant whether or not the occupation was legal.
Third, illegal occupation renders acts of the occupant, outside the bounda-
ries of The Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions, null and void.
In its advisory opinion concerning the illegal presence of South Africa in
Namibia, the International Court of Justice held that States are under legal
obligation to consider South Africa's presence in Namibia as null and void.
It concluded that States shall not recognize South Africa's actions on behalf
of Namibia, including treaty relations, diplomatic relations and economic
dealings.
Applying this to the situation in Iraq leads to the following conclu-
sions: (1) the Coalition may only be considered as an "administrator of
necessity" and may not assume the Iraqi government's authorities and
responsibilities in Iraq; (2) the Coalition may not conduct political, eco-
nomic or foreign relations on behalf of Iraq during the occupation and
other States must boycott the Coalition in its actions on behalf of Iraq; (3)
any national government, whether interim or permanent that is installed
by the Coalition is not recognized by the international community nor are
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its actions on behalf of Iraq and (4) the Coalition may not change the
national laws in Iraq or perform political or economic changes in that
country. Again, such actions would be null and void.
In order to achieve the Coalition's declared goals in Iraq, including the
restructuring of the political and economic process, it was imperative to
earn international recognition of the legality of occupation and its author-
ity to implement structural changes there. Under the prevailing interna-
tional circumstances, this must be achieved through a Security Council
resolution.
III. Security Council Resolution 1483
A. History of the Enactment of Resolution 1483
Upon the declaration by President Bush of the end of major military
operations in Iraq, the United States launched a diplomatic campaign for
the adoption of a new Security Council resolution. The United States,
backed by a prompt military victory, had major political and diplomatic
leverage in negotiating a new Council's resolution. Other Council mem-
bers who resisted the United States' efforts to authorize the use of force
prior to the war were not in a position to challenge such efforts. They had
no immediate strategies to deal with the military and political realities that
emerged upon the Coalition's swift victory. What role the United Nations
could play under the existing circumstances was not clear to them. Their
governments were unsure if and how they could contribute to the political
and economic reconstruction of Iraq, assuming that the Coalition was will-
ing to allow them to participate in such endeavor. Those members were
also not willing to further alienate the United States following the diplo-
matic encounters prior to and during the war that led to the weakening of
their relationships with the United States. On the other side, the United
States was not sure of all the goals it wanted to achieve in relation to the
new situation in Iraq, and through a new Council resolution. Yet, the letter
sent on May 8, 2003 by the Permanent Representatives of the United
States and the United Kingdom to the Security Council, together with the
negotiations records, revealed several U.S. goals, including: (1) legalization
of the Coalition's occupation of Iraq; (2) providing the Coalition with the
authority to govern and administer Iraq for an indefinite period of time,
including the authority for the political and economic reconstruction; (3)
giving the international community and the United Nations only an assist-
ing role in Iraq, subject to the Coalition's control; (4) lifting the economic
and civilian sanctions on Iraq without tying it to the fulfillment of Iraq's
disarmament obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions; and
(5) ending the oil-for-food program in Iraq, which included oil and civilian
goods contracts for billions of U.S. dollars.
One cannot ignore the fact that United States and the United Kingdom
presented to the Council a draft resolution on Iraq and simultaneously
sent the May 8th letter referred to above. It was clear to the members of the
Council that the letter was the basis for what the Coalition needed to
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achieve from the draft resolution. The letter provided that the Coalition
would have responsibility and the authority to: (1) disarm Iraq of its weap-
ons of mass destruction; (2) exercise, through the Coalition's Provisional
Authority (CPA), powers of government on a temporary basis; (3) provide
for the security and administration of Iraq, including the administration of
the economic and financial sectors; (4) rebuild Iraq's military, security,
economic and governmental institutions; (5) facilitate the efforts of the
Iraqi people to create a representative government; and (6) facilitate the
creation of representative institutions of government and transfer responsi-
bilities of administration, progressively and as appropriate, to such
institutions.
The preamble draft resolution stated that [the Council] took note of the
May 8th letter and recognized the specific authorities and responsibilities
under international law of the United States and the United Kingdom as
occupying powers under unified Command (the "Authority"). The letter
was intended to serve as a reference to the resolution if adopted, define the
legal basis for the presence of the Coalition in Iraq, and delineate the scope
of its authorities.
The Security Council eventually adopted the draft, with some amend-
ments, as Resolution 1483. The Resolution provided, interalia, for the
following:
1. Recognition of the authorities and responsibilities of the United States
and the United Kingdom under international law as occupying powers
(Preamble, paragraph 13).
2. The need for the "Authority" (here, the United States and the United
Kingdom) to administer Iraq effectively. (Operative paragraph 4).
3. A supporting and assisting role for the international community and the
United Nations in Iraq (humanitarian relief, security, economic rehabili-
tation, rebuilding the political process. . .). (Operative paragraphs
1,2,8,9,12,15).
4. The need to bring members of the former Iraqi regime who are responsi-
ble for crimes and atrocities to justice. (Operative paragraph 3). Note
that the letter of the United States and the United Kingdom Permanent
Representatives stated that the Coalition would seek to bring those
members to justice.
5. Termination of the sanctions against Iraq, except on military items.
(Operative paragraph 10).
6. The "support" of the Council for the formation of an interim administra-
tion (IIA). The Iraqi people are to create the IIA with the help of the
Authority and the United Nations Special Representative on Iraq. The
aim of the IIA is to serve as a transitional administration until a perma-
nent Iraqi government is established and assumes the responsibilities of
the Authority. (Operative paragraph 9).
7. Creation of the Development Fund for Iraq to be held by the Iraqi Cen-
tral Bank. The Fund's revenues, which include oil sales, returned frozen
Iraqi assets, and assets of the former Iraqi government and regime mem-
bers, shall be disbursed at the direction of the Authority. (Operative
paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 20, 23).
8. Phasing out and eventual termination of the Oil-for-Food program.
(Operative paragraphs 16, 17).
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9. Immunity from legal proceedings for Iraqi oil, its revenues, and for DFI
and its revenues. The immunity would last until the end of the year
2007. (Operative paragraphs 22, 23).
B. The Effect of Resolution 1483
The question then arises as to what the United States has achieved
from the adoption of Resolution 1483?
1. The Occupation of Iraq
Absent a Security Council resolution, the Coalition's occupation of
Iraq would be illegal. Thus, the Coalition's acts in Iraq or on behalf of Iraq
that are beyond the framework of the 1907 Hague Regulations and 1949
Geneva Conventions would be considered null and void. It would have to
withdraw its troops immediately and would incur legal responsibility as a
consequence of such occupation. It may not assume the authorities of the
Iraqi government, including the conduct of political, economic and foreign
relations.
Resolution 1483 gave the Coalition the mandate to occupy Iraq and
recognize the occupant's authority as provided for in the Resolution. It
transformed the occupation from a belligerent one to a legal one, and cre-
ated a special occupation regime that is controlled by the occupying power,
instead of the Security Council Operative paragraph 25 provides that the
Council is to review the "implementation" of the resolution within 12
months of its adoption. In the preceding paragraph, the Council encour-
ages the United States and the United Kingdom to "inform" the Council, at
regular intervals, of "their efforts" under the resolution. One can hardly
consider the ability of the Council to review the implementation of the res-
olution to be a form of control over the occupation. Both the United States
and the United Kingdom have veto powers that can be used to upset future
efforts to give the Council control over the occupation. Further, encourag-
ing the two occupying powers to inform the Council of their efforts under
Resolution 1483 does not amount to an obligation of reporting to the
Council. The use of the word report in the draft resolution, which U.S. and
U.K. negotiators fiercely fought, would have been considered an expression
of the Council's determination to control the mandate it gave to the occu-
pying power.
The special occupation regime goes beyond the rights and obligations
of the occupying power as provided for in the 1907 Hague Resolutions and
1949 Geneva Conventions. During the negotiations of Resolution 1483,
some Council members attempted to incorporate language that would limit
the authorities of the Coalition to those provided for in the Hague Regula-
tions and the Geneva Conventions. This language would have obliged the
occupying power to respect the national laws of Iraq. Further, it would
have provided the Coalition with limited authority in relation to adminis-
tering Iraqi governmental and economic institutions. However, U.S. and
U.K. negotiators rejected such language, and the Council agreed on a gen-
eral provision (Operative paragraph 5) that calls on "all concerned" to
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comply with their obligations under international law, including the
Geneva Conventions and Hague Regulations. The Coalition can always
argue that it is respecting its obligations under those legal instruments,
while exercising their extended authorities under Resolution 1483.
One way the Resolution has extended Coalition authority beyond the
Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions is that the Coalition may gov-
ern Iraq, on behalf of its sovereign government, for an indefinite period.
One should note that under paragraph 9 of Resolution 1483, the Council
expressed its support for the creation of an interim Iraqi administration as
a transitional administration, until a permanent Iraqi government is estab-
lished and assumes the responsibilities of the Coalition. The resolution
did not specify the functions, terms of reference or the scope of authority
of the IIA. It also does not oblige the Coalition to facilitate its creation nor
does it set time limits for its establishment. In addition, by stating that
only the permanent government may assume the responsibilities of the
Coalition, it made clear that the IIA, if and when created, is subject to the
overall authority of the Coalition and can only perform administrative
responsibilities that the Coalition agrees to, and under the latter's control.
Only when a permanent Iraqi government is established can sovereign
authority be transferred to the Iraqis. Paragraph 9 neither sets a time frame
for the creation of a permanent government, nor does it provide that the
establishment of such a government entails the end of occupation and the
withdrawal of the occupying power. In addition, the term "internationally
recognized, representative government" was used instead of "permanent,"
thus making it unclear whether the government referred to is actually the
one to regain Iraqi sovereignty).
The restructuring of military and security institutions goes beyond the
rights given to the occupying power under international humanitarian law.
However, no Council member objected to this approach when the Resolu-
tion was adopted in either official statements or during the explanation of
vote.
Sub-paragraph 8(c) of Resolution 1483 provides that the United
Nations Special Representative on Iraq would have to "work intensively"
with the Coalition and the Iraqi people to restore and establish national
and local institutions of representative governance. The right of the Coali-
tion to "intervene" in such processes is not warranted under international
humanitarian law. IHL leaves the process of rebuilding and creating local
and national institutions to the people under occupation, except for the
security and military needs of the occupying power. The Resolution also
expanded the Coalition's authority by giving it ultimate control over the
economic process, including the creation, administration and restructuring
of Iraqi economic and financial institutions.
Upon the adoption of the resolution, the United States Permanent Rep-
resentative informed the Council that the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI)
was established. According to Resolution 1483, Iraq's Central Bank holds
the DFI, thus recognizing it as an Iraqi institution. Its revenues include the
proceeds of Iraq's oil sales, the remaining assets in the United Nations
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escrow account established for the purposes of the Oil-For-Food program,
and the frozen assets of the government of Iraq and the members of the
former regime and their families. The Resolution also provides that the
DFI shall disburse its funds at the direction of the Coalition and that the
funds may be used for humanitarian needs, repair of Iraq's infrastructure,
disarmament, economic reconstruction, and the costs of Iraqi civilian
administration.
The DFI was established by the occupying powers, not the Security
Council, which merely "noted" its establishment. The Council also gave
the occupying powers a broad mandate over all aspects related to the DFI,
including its revenues, disbursement and management. The only limita-
tion to the occupying powers broad mandate is the establishment of an
International Monitoring and Advisory Board (IAMB). Resolution 1483
governs only the Board's membership, providing that it be composed of a
representative of the United Nations Secretary General and representatives
of international and financial institutions. It also requests the United
Nations Secretary General to report on the work of the IAMB. The only
specific mandate for the IAMB under Resolution 1483 is that it "approves"
the independent public accountant chosen to audit the DFI. The Resolu-
tion is silent about how the IAMB is established, what its advisory and
monitoring functions would be, and the term of reference it would adopt.
Thus, Resolution 1483 gave the occupying powers extended authori-
ties in terms of the economic process in Iraq. The Coalition completely
controls the Iraqi entity responsible for the economic development. The
entire economic reconstruction process is mandated to those powers, with
a minimal role for the United Nations Special Representative, although sub-
paragraph 8(c) of Resolution 1483 provides that the United Nations Spe-
cial Representative will "promote" economic reconstruction in Iraq.
2. The Assisting Role of the International Community and the United
Nations
Resolution 1483 provides an assisting role for the international com-
munity in Iraq. Such a role may become an important one, as the Resolu-
tion preserves the decision making process in relation to the extent of this
assisting role to the Coalition.
a. The Role of States
According to the Resolution, States may perform two main functions.
First, they may assist the Iraqi efforts to reform their institutions and
rebuild their country. The form of assistance is neither specified nor
defined. The Coalition, which assumed the governing authority of Iraq on
behalf of its people during the occupation period, determines and controls
such assisting role. Second, States may contribute to the stability and
security of Iraq. This issue raised significant debate during the negotia-
tions of the resolution. Under international humanitarian law, military
forces that have effective control over the territory of another country or
part of the country are regarded as occupants of that country, or of the part
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the forces effectively control. International humanitarian law considers a
country that sends troops or personnel to work under the unified com-
mand of an occupant to be an occupant as well. As such, any State that
contributes to the stability and security in Iraq by sending troops or per-
sonnel to work under the unified command of the Coalition becomes an
occupant. Whether the personnel or troops perform military tasks or law
enforcement operations, they would be under of command of the Coali-
tion, becoming part of the occupying forces. The United States and the
United Kingdom incorporated language in the resolution to give political
cover to States that want to contribute troops or police forces. Paragraph
14 of the preamble provides that States [other than the United States and
the United Kingdom] that are not occupying powers are working now or in
the future may work under the Authority. This language does not change
the status of any State as an occupant, if the State contributes military or
police forces to secure or stabilize Iraq.
b. The Coordinating, Facilitating and Assisting Role of the United
Nations in Iraq
Several Security Council members advocated a central role for the
United Nations in Iraq during the negotiations of Resolution 1483. Some
called for a full United Nations operation in Iraq, where the organization
would control the administration of the country and its political and eco-
nomic reconstruction. Less ambitious members called for United Nations
authority in developing the political and economic process in Iraq, includ-
ing control over the rebuilding of Iraqi institutions, deciding the framework
and time line for elections, and the administration of Iraq's oil industry
and trade. The outcome of negotiations provided the United Nations with
a vital, yet peripheral, assisting and coordinating role that does not inter-
fere with the overall authority of the Coalition. Resolution 1483 requests
that the United Nations Secretary General appoint a Special Representative
who is to coordinate United Nations activities in Iraq, coordinate the
humanitarian and reconstruction efforts of the United Nations and inter-
national agencies and, in coordination with the Coalition, assist the people
of Iraq. On the political level, the Resolution presented the Special Repre-
sentative with the task of working with the Iraqi people and the Coalition
to restore national institutions and to "facilitate" a process leading to an
internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq. In July
2003, the Special Representative announced the creation of a Governing
Council in Iraq through a process that he facilitated. However, the Coali-
tion approved the full composition of the Governing Council.
c. International Financial Institutions
Resolution 1483 provides that international financial institutions may
assist Iraq by making financial contributions to the reconstruction of Iraq
and by helping the process of restructuring Iraq's sovereign debt
(Paragraphs 15 and 22).
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d. The Sanctions on Iraq
Resolution 1483 lifted and terminated all forms of non-military sanc-
tions on Iraq. Despite efforts by some Council members during the negoti-
ations of the Resolution to suspend the sanctions against Iraq until Iraq
fulfills its disarmament obligations, the United States and the United King-
dom managed to secure the total lifting of such sanctions in the Resolution.
The disarmament obligations as provided for in the relevant Security
Council resolutions, most notably Resolutions 687, 1284 and 1441, condi-
tion the lifting of sanctions on the performance by "Iraq" of disarmament
obligations and the verification of the process by the international inspec-
tors. Accepting that the disarmament obligations were not legally imposed
on Saddam Hussein regime but on Iraq as a State, the United States and the
United Kingdom agreed to maintain such obligations in the Resolution. In
exchange, the other permanent members of the Council agreed to termi-
nate all non-military sanctions on Iraq.
e. The Oil-For-Food Program
During the negotiations of Resolution 1483, the United States argued
that the Oil-For-Food Program (O.F.F.) should be terminated as a result of
ending the sanctions on Iraq. The United States advanced valid reasons for
its position. O.F.F. involved tens of billion of dollars worth of oil and civil-
ian goods contracts. A significant number of those contracts were long-
term, expiring after several years. In addition, the escrow account of O.F.
held billions of dollars of funds. To finance Iraq's reconstruction from
Iraq's own resources, including oil, it was necessary to terminate the pro-
gram controlling, in effect, all of Iraq's financial and economic resources.
There were several obstacles to terminating O.F.F. First, the vast
majority of Iraqis depended on O.F.F. for their livelihoods. If O.F.F. termi-
nated abruptly, a human disaster would result in Iraq. The second prob-
lem was that many Council members and some U.S. allies had a significant
number of contracts under O.F.F. Terminating the program would cause
major financial losses to those countries. A third problem is legal. Iraq,
the United Nations, and possibly the Coalition were legally liable for can-
celled O.F.F. contracts. After careful consideration, the Council agreed that
the program would continue for six months from the time of adoption of
the resolution. During that period, the United Nations would execute con-
tracts of humanitarian priority and of utility to the Iraqi people. After-
wards, the Coalition's Authority would be responsible for their execution.
This arrangement left a significant number of O.F.F. contracts unim-
plemented. Resolution 1483 provides that it will be the responsibility of
the permanent Iraqi government, when created, to determine whether to
fulfill such contracts. This provision protects the Coalition from civil lia-
bility for those unfulfilled contracts and the United Nations is immune
from any legal or judicial process. Thus, Iraq alone is legally responsible
for such contracts.
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3. Resolution 1483 and the Use of Force Against Iraq
The Resolution does not address the legality of the use of force against
Iraq whether directly or indirectly. One may argue that by recognizing the
authority of the Coalition as an occupying power in Iraq, the Resolution
indirectly recognizes the legality of the Coalition's use of force. This argu-
ment does not have a standing under the rules of international humanita-
rian law and the United Nations Charter, which require the authorization
to use force to be prior to the commencement of military action. Recogni-
tion of the authority of the Coalition as occupants in Iraq was the most
pragmatic method for the Council to manage the situation. Resolution
1483 does not indicate to the contrary. In addition, several Council mem-
bers made clear that one should not interpret their votes in favor of Resolu-
tion 1483 to mean that they accept the legality to use force. The United
States and the United Kingdom's official comments to the Resolution never
interpreted the Resolution as recognizing the legality to use force.
Under Paragraph 11 of Resolution 1483, the Council encourages the
Coalition to keep the Council informed of their activities concerning Iraq's
disarmament obligations. The provision responds to the letter of May 8,
2003 in which the United States and the United Kingdom expressed their
intent to search for and destroy weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Para-
graph 10 does not provide that the two countries act on behalf of the
Council in enforcing its resolutions relevant to Iraq's disarmament
obligations.

